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NOTE
RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
The first case of larceny may have taken place when one cave man entered
another cave and appropriated his neighbor's hard-earned dinner. But the crime
has developed into a vast and profitable business. However, while the early cave
man stole in order to keep the dinner for himself, the crime of larceny, as now
practiced by "professional" thieves, is seldom carried out so that the actual artides
stolen may be enjoyed or used by the thief. Larceny has been made profitable because of the possibilities of disposing of the goods for money, making "dealing"
in stolen articles as prevalent as the actual thefts. In recognition that the elimination
of the power of the thief to dispose of the goods serves to limit the extent of the
crime of larceny, the crime of punishing receivers of stolen goods has developed.
"It seems probable that at common law one who received stolen goods
knowing them to have been stolen was only guilty of a misprision or
compounding of a felony, and afterwards, under an English statute, as
accessory to the fact to the larceny, though there is authority for saying
that the reception of stolen goods was a substantive misdemeanor at
common law. There are now, however, in England, and doubtless in
all states, statutes making the receiving a substantive offense if the recipient knows the goods were stolen.' 1
The act of April 11, 1825 established the misdemeanor of receiving goods
which shall have been "feloniously taken or stolen" in Pennsylvania, providing
that the receiver might be prosecuted although the principal felons be not before
convicted. 2 This act was superseded in March, 1860.8 The subject matter of the
crime, as defined in 1860, included "any goods, chattels, moneys or securities, or
any other matter or thing, the stealing of which is made larceny by any law of
the commonwealth." The major change was in making the crime a felony and providing that upon conviction the defendant should "suffer the like pains and
renalties which are by law imposed upon the person who shall have actually stolen
or feloniously carried away the same."
The act of April, 19094 defined the subject matter as being that which "shall
have been stolen or feloniously taken," and superseded the act of 1860.
In 1939 the penalty was changed to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both. The statute as it now reads provides that: 5
"Whoever buys, has, or receives any goods, chattels, money or securities, or any other matter or thing, which shall have been stolen or
1 Miller,
620; Post.
2 Act of
9 Act of
4 Act of
6 Act of

Criminal Law, § 125 (1934), citing 2 Bish., Criminal Law, § 1137; 1 Hale P.C. 619,
Criminal Law 373; People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422.
1825, April 11, P.L. 165, 8 Sm. L. 438.
1860, March 31, P.L. 382, § 109.
1909, April 23, P.L. 159, § 1.
1939, June 24, P.L. 872, § 817.

NOTE

feloniously taken, either in this Commonwealth or in any other state
or country, knowing or having reasonable cause to know the same to
have been stolen or feloniously taken, is guilty of a felony ..
The italicized portion was added by amendment in 1943.6
Analysis of a crime consists of determining the physical and mental elements of the crime. Consideration of the mental elements has been affected by
the amendment of 1943 as shown above. For that reason the interpretation of
the mental elements must be considered both before and after the passage of
the amendment.
Consideration of the physical elements of the crime is not difficult, in comparison with the mental elements, because the components- (1) the character
of the property to which the statute relates, and (2) the act which must be done
with reference to the property-are well defined by statute.
The present statute includes "any goods, chattels, money or securities, or
any other matter or thing." The common law definition was limited to those goods
which had been stolen, i.e., the subject of larceny. By including those goods "stolen
or feloniously taken", the Pennsylvania statute appears to extend the crime to include receiving goods which have been misappropriated by embezzlement or false
pretenses. However there is no case authority to support this conclusion and until
a definite decision is handed down the conclusion must remain speculative.
The burden is placed on the prosecution to prove that the goods were stolen.7
The statute makes it a crime to "buy, have, or receive" such property. There may
be, therefore: (1) a buying without a having or receiving, (2) a having without
a buying or receiving, or (3) a receiving without a buying; and in each case the
defendant is guilty. 8
The goods received must be the same goods which were stolen or feloniously
taken although it is not necessary that they be all of the goods stolen. "The receipt
of the proceeds of the stolen property, either by exchange or by sale, is not a receiving of stolen goods within the meaning of the statute.' 9
"A mere proof of an unexecuted agreement, entered into after a larceny, to
participate in the sale of the goods known to have been stolen, will not warrant
conviction for receiving stolen goods. '10 But the requirement that the goods must
be received into the possession of the recipient does not require actual manual
possession.1 1
Although the goods must be the same as those stolen, evidence of receiving
goods other than those charged is admissible to show guilty knowledge. 12 In the
6 Act of 1943, May 21, P.L. 306, § 1.

'
8
9
10
11
12

Commonwealth v. Walter, 97 Pa. Sup. 244 (1929).
1 Trickett, Law of Crimes in Pennsylvania, p. 39.
Commonwealth v. Riley and Golden, 30 C.C. 316, 13 Dist. 669, 6 Lack. 7 (1904).
Commonwealth v. Light, 195 Pa. 220, 45 A. 933 (1900).
Ibid.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 132 Pa. 293, 19 A. 402; 26 W.N.C. 3 (1890).
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prosecution of the receiver it is immaterial who stole the goods as long as they
were stolen.1
In determining the mental element of the crime there is considerably more
difficulty. First, actual knowledge is subjective and, in the absence of actual witnesses, is difficult to prove. In addition, often the eye-witnesses are the thieves
and the question then arises concerning the acceptance of a thief's testimony. Secondly, the statute itself does not include specific mention of a guilty intent although the court has applied a "guilty knowledge and a guilty intent,"' 1 4 in interpreting the statute.
The concept of guilty intent has remained virtually undefined by either changes in the statutes or through judicial decisions. Courts in some jurisdictions have
applied this intent by analogy to the crime of larceny. Generally it is not necessary
that the intent be lucri causa. The intent may be to shelter or accommodate the thief
or it may be to defraud or deprive the true owner of his property in the goods.
However, one who receives goods, though knowing them to have been stolen,
but with an honest or innocent intent, such as to aid in apprehending the thief
15
or to return the goods without reward to the true owner, would not be held guilty.
"Guilty knowledge" as defined by the statute preceeding amendment in 1943
required that defendant must "know the same to have been stolen or feloniously
taken." This gave rise to the use of the objective means of ascertaining actual
knowledge by circumstantial evidence as early as 1871.16 In Commonwealth v.
Moreland17 the finder of property indicated guilty knowledge of its character as
stolen by appropriating it to his own use and misrepresenting his possession of
it so as to show a guilty knowledge.
The presumption of guilty knowledge based on "recent and unexplained"
possession has become an important part of the evidence for prosecution in many
cases although it was partially rejected in an early case which ruled "there can
be no knowledge where the goods were found in a locked suitcase in defendant's
room and there is nothing to show that he knew of the contents."' 8 Recent possession alone is not enough to convict but it provides the basis for finding guilty
knowledge by circumstantial evidence.
"A verdict of guilty on a trial of an indictment for receiving stolen
goods will be sustained, where it is established beyond doubt that the
defendant had received the goods which had recently been stolen, and
the circumstances under which he received them were such as to warrant
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, that he must have known that he
was receiving stolen goods." 1 9
Is Commonwealth v. Zaluda, 18 North. L. J. 274 (1938).
14 Commonwealth v. Cohen et al., 157 Pa. Sup. 647 (1945).
16 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1236 (12th ed. 1932).
16 Commonwealth v. Moorby, 8 Phila. 615, 3 Lanc. Bar, No. 21 (1871).
17 Commonwealth v. Moreland, 27 Pitts. 217 (1880).
18 Commonwealth v. Kopanchus, 13 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 37 (1905).
19 Commonwealth v. Pearl, 64 Pa. Sup. 490 (1916).
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By 1942 the recent possession principle had become a presumption of guilty
knowledge requiring that defendant go forward with the evidence to rebut the
presumption. The presumption "will justify a conviction if he does not meet
it by a reasonable explanation, and it is a question for the jury to decide whether
or not the defendant has met such burden." 20
An early case illustrates how the recent possession theory combined with
other circumstances to indicate knowledge on the part of the defendant to convince the jury of guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. A number of heavy
iron fish plates which had been stolen and could be easily identified were found
in a barn used by the defendant in his business as a junk dealer. Defendant gave
answers concerning the plates which were judged to be false and he failed to
explain how he got them. The court said:
"The particular nature of the property, its quantity, and the fact that
itwas not an article of ordinary commerce, but bore the ear-marks of
private ownership when found in the possession of the defendant, taken
in connection with the fact that he failed to explain satisfactorily how he
got it, may warrant a conclusion of guilty knowledge that it was stolen,
and conviction under21a count of receiving stolen goods knowing them
to have been stolen."
The sets of circumstances which have been held sufficient to convict defendants on guilty knowledge have been varied. A conviction on an indictment for
receiving as stolen four bales of tobacco was sustained where two accomplices testified in a "straight-forward manner, without their testimony being shaken in the
slightest particular by cross-examination" that they were employed by the defendant
to steal the tobacco, and to deliver it to him, and that when they delivered the tobacco the defendant sent his son to a bank to have a check cashed to pay them.
This was corroborated by proof that on the day in question a check was drawn by
22
the defendant and charged to his account.
Commonwealth v. Walter2" stated that if the defendant did not know that
the goods (in this case chickens) had been stolen, the facts (1) that he was so
informed some time after he had completed the purchase and (2) that he then
sold them, would not alone be enough to sustain his conviction of receiving stolen
goods knowing them to have been stolen. The requirement of knowledge at the
time of receiving was affirmed in Commonwealth v. Sendrow.24
Each case involving circumstantial evidence is tried by different juries, and
each juror applies his own individual interpretation of the evidence as to whether
the defendant knew that the goods in question had been stolen. It is probable that
many individual jurors reason that they themselves, had they known the circumstances which evidence showed to exist, would have known or suspected that the
20 Commonwealth v. Lindie et al., 147 Pa. Sup. 335, 24 A.2d 39, (1942).
21 Commonwealth v. Woll, 16 Dist. 189, 32 Pa. C.C. 477, 10 North. 272 (1907).

22 Commonwealth v. Evans, 70 Pa. Sup. 534, affirming 36 Lanc. Rev. 25.
28 See n. 7, supra.
24 Commonwealth v. Sendrow, 119 Pa. Sup. 603; 181 A. 450 (1935).
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goods were stolen. Therefore, the juror further reasons, this particular defendant
knew them to have been stolen. However, the trial judge was not permitted to
include this reasoning process in his instructions to the jury. In Commonwealth
v. Baker 5 the trial court charged the jury that the defendant could be convicted
if he knew or if "an ordinary prudent person" would have known that the goods
were stolen. This was held to be reversible error by the superior court. While the
jury could infer guilty knowledge from imprudent actions the judge could not
charge that imprudent action would equal knowledge as a matter of law.
The following year another attempt was made to incorporate the test of what
a "prudent man" should have known when the jury was instructed that the question at issue was:
"Whether the defendant knew positively the goods were stolen
and if he did not know that, whether by reason of his knowledge of the
business and the price of the merchandise, he knew that he was buying it
at such a price as to put him on notice and inquiry as to where the person
who was selling him
the merchandise could possibly have gotten it for
' '2 6
sale at such a price.

The superior court reaffirmed its ruling in the Baker case because, while
those circumstances could all be considered in determining guilty knowledge,
nevertheless the jury must have been satisfied that "the defendant knew the goods
had been stolen when he received them.' '27 (Italics by the court.)
Often a case arises where the testimony of the thief is an important part of
the prosecution's case. Some states hold that the thief who actually delivers the
goods to the defendant on trial for receiving stolen goods is an accomplice to the
receiving and, therefore, it is necessary to corroborate his testimony.28 Other states
do not consider the thief an accomplice, making it unnecessary to corroborate his
testimony. The development of the rule in Pennsylvania, however, does not follow
either of these methods. Pennsylvania considers the thief who delivers the goods
to be an accomplice to the receiving but, although it is the practice of the courtro weigh more carefully the testimony of the thief than that of the other witnesses,
it is not necessary to fully corroborate his testimony. "If this was required a con29
viction could be had without his testimony at all."
However, in proving that the goods were stolen, which is the first point to
be shown on an indictment, it has been ruled that the testimony of the thief, although a competent witness, should be corroborated and "if uncorroborated a
conviction should not be permitted to rest." 30
No common law rule in Pennsylvania forbids a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice if his evidence satisfies the jury of the guilt
25 Commonwealth v. Baker, 115 Pa. Sup. 183; 175 A. 438 (1934).
26 See n. 24, supra.
27

Ibid.

28 People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 143 N.E. 256, 32 A.L.R. 447 (1924).
29 Kilrow v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 480 (1879).

80 Commonwealth v. Poots, 18 Phila. 477 (1886).

NOTE

of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 81 Commonwealth v. Dyers2 qualified
a conviction on this basis by providing that the trial judge must also be satisfied
that the accomplice "has told the truth."
The conviction of a thief in a previous trial does not prove that the goods in
question in a trial for receiving stolen property were stolen. On the trial of an indictment for receiving stolen goods the trial judge instructed the jury that it had
been "passed upon by competent authority" that the goods had been stolen. By
that expression he instructed the jury that, on the trial which immediately preceded that of the defendant, another person had been convicted of stealing the
property which the defendant was accused of having received with guilty knowledge.
"One accused of having received stollen goods 'vith intention to
convert them to his own use, knowing at the time that they were stolen,
is not within the meaning of the Constitution, confronted with the witnesses against him, if the fact that the goods were stolen is established
simply by the statement of the trial judge that in another criminal case to
which the accused was not a party, a defendant had been convicted of
stealing the property." 88
The court added, in dicta, that that fact would not have been proved by offering in evidence the record of the criminal trial convicting the thief.
In respect to the defense available to the defendant, Commonwealth v. Parshall8 4 held that it is always proper to show title or right of possession of property
in the person from whom the defendant received the goods by the best evidence
available. Commonwealth v. Jones3 6 affirmed the principle generally followed in
criminal law that the burden of proof in showing guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt is on the Commonwealth.
The last major case based on the 1939 act as unamended, although the final
86
decision came after the amendment was passed, was Commonwealth v. Frankina.
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, ruled that evidence that a stranger offered
to sell a driver salesman of a drug company six bottles of sulfadiazine tablets in the
rear of a trash truck at a price below jobber's price was such as "would lead a reasonably prudent man to suspect the goods had been stolen" and "these circumstances might properly be considered in arriving at determination of accused's
guilt, and may lead to the conclusion of guilty knowledge."
Throughout the development of the use of circumstantial evidence, it has
been seen that the courts have more readily accepted evidence which would lead
a juror to base his verdict of defendant's actual guilty knowledge upon the fact that
81 Commonwealth v. Klein, 42 Pa. Sup. 66 (1910) ; also federal case holding the same principle:
Freedman v. U.S., 274 F. 603, affirming U.S. v. Freedman, 268 F. 665.
82 Commonwealth v. Dyer, 26 Dist. 414 (1917).
33 See n. 7, supra.
84 Commonwealth v. Parshall, 139 Pa. Sup. 161; 11 A.2d 506 (1940).
85 Commonwealth v. Jones, 50 Dauph. 336 (1941).
88 Commonwealth v. Frankina, 156 Pa. Sup. 152; 39 A.2d 628 (1944).
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a reasonable man would have known that the goods had been stolen. And this
basis was successful as long as the trial judge did not mention the reasonable man
as a basis as a matter of law. The amendment of 1943, however, did not grow
entirely out of the desire to make it possible for a judge to refer to this test of
knowledge in his instructions to the jury. There was a precedent for the amendment in the crime of bringing stolen property into the state. An act of June 24,
1939 provided that:
"Whoever brings, aids or assists in bringing into this Commonwealth any goods, chattels, money, or securities, or any other matter or
thing, knowing or having reasonable cause to know the same to have
been stolen or feloniously taken in any other state or country, is guilty
of a felony ....(fine to $2,000; imprisonment not more than five years,
or both.) 37 (Italics supplied.)
That statute was based on an act of June, 191938 which, except for'the penalties, contained the same provisions, including the reference to "having reasonable cause to know." The burden was placed on anyone bringing goods into the
state to inquire and reasonably ascertain that the goods had not been stolen or
feloniously taken. Perhaps the two crimes of bringing stolen property into the
Commonwealth and receiving stolen goods are analagous to the extent that if one
requires guilty knowledge the other should have the same requirement; or, if
one allows convictions on "having reasonable caus'e 'to know" the other crime
should do likewise. However, there may be seen a distinction between the two
crimes which would make requiring actual knowledge in the crime of receiving
stolen goods logical even though "reasonable cause to know" would be sufficient
in the crime of bringing goods into the state. That distinction is the greater importance in convicting those who actually deal in stolen goods as opposed to prosecution of the actual receivers or ultimate consumers of the goods. Several foreign
penal codes recognize this distinction by providing a severer punishment where
the defendant is actually dealing in the goods. 39 And it is the "professional fence"
or dealer in stolen goods against whom these laws are primarily directed.
Nevertheless in 1943 an amendment was made to the law of 1939 providing
for conviction if the defendant had had reasonable cause to know that the goods
had been stolen. 40 When a law is changed to make conviction easier there is also
the chance, in such change, that circumstantial evidence may more readily be used
to convict innocent individuals. Keeping in mind that one of the purposes of
punishing receivers of stolen goods is to actually eliminate the crime of larceny,
the question then arises: whether the risk of convicting blameless individuals is
outweighed by the value to society in further serving the purpose of punishing offenders-in this case the elimination of larceny.
Act of 1939, June 24, P.L. 872, § 818.
88 Act of 1919, June 20, P.L. 542, § 1.
89 Hall, Criminal Law and Procedure, 467 (1949).
87

40 See a. 6, supra.

NOTE

Statistics are often useful as a guide in determining issues. However, their
value to decide this question is doubtful because of the complexities of the situation.
A table could be worked out showing the number of convictions of receivers of
stolen goods prior to the amendment and the number of like convictions for a
comparable period following the amendment. It is possible, though not certain,
that the more recent figures would be greater. In order for the figures to reflect
accurately the effectiveness of the amendment, however, it would be necessary
to compensate for such factors as increased drives by law enforcement officers
to root out the guilty, greater thoroughness in prosecuting the accused, and determination if the rise in conviction (again assuming that there would be such rise)
is due to an increase in the number of larceny cases, in which case the proportion
of convictions may actually be less. Such interpretation of the figures could be
made favorable to both proponents and opponents of the easing of the burden
of prosecution in exchange for the possibility of convicting the innocent.
The situation of a juror in determining that a "reasonably prudent man"
should have known that the goods were stolen is analogous to the "Monday-morning-quarterback" in football. It is always easier to look back at fact situations and
determine what should have been done than it is to be actually "in the game"
where all the facts do not appear in a body. The prosecution's brief, like movies
of the game, often illustrates more clearly what should have been done in a
situation than could be seen at the time of the event or play. Even if the case is
clear cut-that is, it is obvious that a reasonable man would have known that the
goods were stolen-the defendant may not be a reasonable man. The defendant, in
such case, is being made a criminal, not because he received stolen goods knowing
them to have been stolen, but he is criminal because he is less than prudent. Notwithstanding the fact that the judge may exercise a certain amount of discretion in
deciding the amount of fine or imprisonment, the defendant may be made criminal because he does not measure up to an arbitrary standard.
Pennsylvania appellate courts seem to be reluctant to extend the doctrine of
the ammendment to its possible extremes. The effect has been to further broaden
the possibility of inference of guilty knowledge from the circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Cohen41 cited the Parshallcase 42 that "proof of guilty knowledge involving guilty intent, is essential to the Commonwealth's case, but may be
supplied by other than direct evidence."
In the Cohen case there was 'evidence that the defendant had been told that
the goods (radios, at the peak of war-time scarcity) had been stolen, but the judge
said that even if they had not been told that they had been stolen, the circumstances under which they were acquired "from two men who certainly looked
their real characters to wit: criminals of the worst type. .. should have prompted
the defendants to inquire as to where and how the sellers acquired the radios."' 4
41 See n. 14, supra.
42 See a. 34, supra.
48 See n. 14, supra.
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"Without the direct and positive testimony that defendants were
told that the radios had been stolen, there was ample evidence to justify
a reasonable and natural inference by the jury that they had been stolen
and that defendants purchased them with knowledge of the fact." (Italics supplied.)
In Commonwealth v. Wojdakowski 44 the trial judge reverted to the instruction of the Marmo45 case and told the jury:
"The facts and circumstances must be such as to exclude to a moral
certainty every hypothesis but that of guilt of the offense which is charged. In other words, the facts and circumstances must not only be consistent with and point to the guilt of the accused but they must be inconsistent with his innocence."
The defendant, who did not testify in the trial, appealed to the superior court
which ruled that this instruction was more favorable to the defendants titan they
were entitled to. The case illustrates the trial court's reluctance to apply the amendment of 1943.
Commonwealth v. Roth46 ruled that the Commonwealth need not demonstrate the utter impossibility of innocence, but to support a charge of receiving
stolen goods "the Commonwealth must prove (1) that certain goods were stolen;
(2) that the defendant received some or all such goods; and (3) that he received them knowing the same to be stolen." Thus, although allowing the jury
to draw guilty knowledge from circumstances, the case held that the jury must be
satisfied that the defendant actually knew-not that he reasonably should have
known. The three elements which the Commonwealth must prove were reaffirmed
in the decision of Commonwealth v. Gladden.47 This concerned forty-eight ingots
allegedly stolen from the government which were distinctive in size and the nature
of the markings. The defendants gave no exculpatory explanation of how they came
into their possession and "competent testimony" showed the ingots to belong to the
government. "From the possession of recently stolen goods of such unusual characthat the defendant knew or had reasonable
ter, size and markings, the jury may infer
4
stolen."'
were
ingots
the
know
cause to
Although the court uses the term "or had reasonable cause to know" it seems
to have been qualified in a following statement:
"Although the evidence of appellant's guilt is largely circumstantial,
the court below was fully justified in concluding that the ingots found
in appellant's possession were part of the forty-eight ingots missing, that
the inots had been stolen, and that appellant knew that they werle
stolen. 4

44 Commonwealth v. Wojdakowski et al. 161 Pa. Sup. 250 (1947).
45 Commonwealth v. Marmo, 137 Pa. Sup. 467, 9 A.2d 181 (1940).
46 Commonwealth v. Roth, 169 Pa. Sup. 88 (1951).
47 Commonwealth v. Gladden, 173 Pa. Sup. 545 (1953).
48 Application of Commonwealth v. Joyce, 159 Pa. Sup. 45, 46 A.2d 529 (1946).
49

See a. 47, supra.

NOTE

Thus, while at first inspection it appears that the court would be satisfied
with "reasonable cause to know", the reluctance to accept that idea completely is
seen in the full statement. The standard of applying circumstantial evidence is
that set forth in Commonwealth v. Marino.50
"When a crime charged is sought to be sustained wholly by circumstantial evidence the circumstances proved should be such as reasonably
and naturally to justify an inference of the guilt of the accused, and
should be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption
of innocence and satisfy the jury of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
There has been one case since the passage of the amendment which has gone
further toward applying the doctrine of the amendment than the appellate courts
have, as yet, been willing to go. 5 ' The Washington County judge considers that
the "amendment clearly indicates that the mere absence of knowledge on the part
of the defendant would no longer be sufficient (to acquit) if he had reasonable
cause to know that the goods were stolen." Although in the particular case cited
the circumstantial evidence may well have been sufficient for the jury to infer
actual guilty knowledge and thus justify the conviction, the statement of the judge,
if applied to all cases, would make possible the conviction of actually blameless
individuals whose only fault is being less than the arbitrary "prudent man" and
what the judge called the "mere absence of knowledge" would no longer be
mere but would convict an innocent person.
The Dopler case summarizes the development of the law on receiving stolen
goods.52
"Under the Criminal Code as originally passed, proof of guilty
knowledge involving a guilty intent was essential to establish the charge
of receiving stolen goods. While under the amendment it is not required
that there be knowfedge that goods were stolen, if it be shown that the
defendant had reasonable cause to know that the goods received by him
wvere stolen goods. It has always been held that proof of knowledge may
be produced by proof of circumstances, from which the jury could infer
the knowledge and guilty intent on the part of the defendant. Since the
amending act of 1943 there is all the more reason for reliance on proof
of the circumstances surroundin the transaction, since those circumstances may be proof that the defendant knew the goods were stolen or
th may show that he had reasonable cause to know they were stolen,
nthi proof may be furnished entirely by circumstantial evidence." 5 8
The judge then cited the Marino case 54 to illustrate the means of application
of the circumstantial evidence, and thLe Meyers case 55 in support of the theory that
50 Commonwealth v. Marino, 142 Pa. Sup. 327; 16 A.2d 314 (1940).
51

52

Commonwealth v. Dopier, 26 Wash. 179 (1946).

Ibid.

58 Application of Commonwealth v. Meyers, 154 Pa. Sup. 8, 34 A.2d 916 (1944); also n. 14,
n. 36, supra.
54 See n. 50, supra.
55 Meyers case, see n. 53, supra.
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burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require the Commonwealth
to "demonstrate the utter impossibility of innocence."
In the final analysis the question remains: how best to frame a statute which,
through judicial interpretation, will have the effect of eliminating larceny by eliminating the means of disposing of stolen goods, while at the same time protecting
individuals who are not criminal but who, perhaps unreasonably, accept goods
which have been stolen. The risk of convicting blameless defendants can be discerned in such statements as "the mere absence of knowledge on the part of the
defendant ......
The conclusion is reached, therefore, that the present statute has not yet
been perfected, nor perhaps may it be expected that a law can be perfected in an
ever-changing society. However, such changes as a definite pronouncement on
"guilty intent," and specific limitations on the use of the amendment to prevent,
as far as possible, conviction of the innocent, should be seriously considered.
Harman R. Clark
Member of the Junior Class

